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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
 Does the First Amendment forbid Vermont from 
giving physicians the freedom to keep their private 
medical practice information confidential? 
 
ii 
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IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The New England Journal of Medicine 
(NEJM) is the oldest continuously published medical 
journal in the world, and has published numerous 
scholarly articles on, among other things, advances in 
drug therapy, prescription drug side effects, and the 
role of the United States Food and Drug Administra-
tion and the pharmaceutical industry in our health 
care system. 
 The Massachusetts Medical Society, with 
some 22,000 physician and student members, is 
dedicated to educating and advocating for the pa-
tients and physicians of Massachusetts. We publish 
the New England Journal of Medicine, a leading 
global medical journal and web site, and Journal 
Watch alerts and newsletters covering 13 specialties. 
We are also a leader in continuing medical education 
for health care professionals throughout Massachu-
setts, conducting a variety of medical education 
programs for physicians and health care profession-
als. Founded in 1781, we are the oldest continuously 
operating medical society in the country. 
  
 
 1 This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as 
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule 
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole 
or in part by counsel for any party. All expenses of amici have 
been borne by their own resources, without support from any 
party.  
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 The National Physicians Alliance (NPA) is a 
membership organization of physicians across spe-
cialties throughout the United States who seek to 
restore physicians’ primary emphasis on the core 
values of our profession: service, integrity, and advo-
cacy for our patients. We work to improve health and 
well being, and to ensure equitable, affordable, high 
quality health care for all people.  
 The American Medical Student Association 
(AMSA) is the oldest and largest independent associ-
ation of physicians-in-training in the United States, 
with more than 33,000 members. Founded in 1950, 
AMSA is a student-governed, nonprofit organization 
representing the concerns of physicians-in-training. 
AMSA advocates for evidence-based rather than 
marketing-based prescribing practices, the removal of 
conflicts of interest, and global access to essential 
medicines. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 As amended, the Prescription Confidentiality 
Law does not include any state-sponsored intrusion 
into the “marketplace of ideas.” Vermont does not ban 
data mining or drug advertising, but leaves the data 
mining decision in the hands of the prescribing 
physician. The only state action here is to empower 
Vermont physicians with the freedom to choose 
privacy. 
3 
 Most Vermont physicians have not chosen to 
embrace data mining. Data mining offends the priva-
cy of the physician and also permits companies to 
identify particular patients and communities without 
consent. In addition to the privacy concerns, these 
practices are dangerous and raise health care costs.  
 The Prescription Confidentiality Law is part of a 
larger statutory framework of state and federal laws 
protecting medical privacy. Federal law has carved 
out a special role for more stringent state medical 
privacy laws, protecting them from federal preemp-
tion. The First Amendment is also not a defense to 
violations of copyright, trade secrecy, and privacy 
laws.  
 Nor does the First Amendment require this Court 
to overturn the legislative determination by the 
elected government of Vermont, especially when the 
state has extensive experience as a health care payor 
and has left the ultimate decision to the physician. 
 The Amici Curiae are leading organizations 
representing and educating physicians and medical 
students. We have followed these issues carefully for 
a number of years. We urge this Court to agree with 
Vermont, and leave the data mining decision to the 
physicians.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
   
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VERMONT STATUTE EMPOWERS 
PHYSICIANS TO PROTECT MEDICAL 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 As the oldest continuously published medical 
journal in the world, amicus THE NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE is directly interested in com-
mercial speech issues involving medicine. The amici 
file this brief with no pecuniary interest in the out-
come, but with a deep respect for the privacy and 
confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship. The 
Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law, 2007 Vt. 
Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 17 (2007) (“Prescription 
Confidentiality Law” or “Section 17”), protects those 
vital interests without offending the First Amend-
ment. App.129a-140a.2 
 The Respondents assert the novel claim that 
private companies can use and sell private health 
information, violating state law, without the consent 
of any of the individuals involved. This case isn’t 
fundamentally an issue of commercial speech; our 
view as medical publishers, physicians and medical 
students is that data miners have wrongfully con-
verted private health information for commercial 
purposes without consent. Data miners should not 
 
 2 References to “App._a” are to the appendix filed with the 
certiorari petition; “JA_” are to the Joint Appendix filed with the 
Pet. Brief; and to “A-_” are to the appendix filed in the Second 
Circuit. 
5 
have a First Amendment right to use or sell private 
health information. Put another way, intent to pub-
lish is not a defense to violation of medical privacy 
laws.  
 
A. Data Mining Invades Medical Privacy 
and Confidentiality 
 The clinical encounter between physicians and 
their patients is the core relationship in medicine. 
Our laws have long recognized that the patient visit 
also creates private health information, often of an 
intimate nature. See the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191 (defining federal health privacy rights); 45 
C.F.R. § 160.101, et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.102, et seq. 
(HIPAA Privacy Rule), and the recently enacted 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (protecting 
individual genetic information). Few of us would 
want our medical records released to the public or 
sold for commercial exploitation without our consent. 
 Respondents do not deny that prescriber-
identifiable medical records lay bare the intimate 
details of physicians’ prescribing patterns for their 
patients. Brief for Respondent Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Manufacturers of America, On Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari, at 4, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 857 (Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 10-779) [hereinaf-
ter “PhRMA Cert. Brief ”] (“For example, a pharma-
ceutical representative who specializes in diabetes 
6 
medicines may use prescriber-identifiable data to 
identify those physicians in her region who write a 
significant number of prescriptions for diabetes or 
cardiology medications (and thus, likely to treat a 
large number of diabetes patients).”); Brief of Re-
spondents IMS Health Inc., On Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, at 3, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
857 (Dec. 16, 2010) (No. 10-779) [hereinafter “IMS 
Cert. Brief ”] (similar). Data mining gives Respond-
ents a clear view of exactly what happens in the 
physician’s private office with particular patients by 
tracking each patient with a “longitudinal” “linking 
code” as the “fifth P” following individual patients, 
JA158-60, 482-84. Data mining Respondent Verispan 
boasted that “patient behavior can be directly influ-
enced” using “actual prescription fills at the patient 
level,” JA482, 484-86. Data mining subjects physi-
cians to “various kinds of leverage,” IMS Health Inc. 
v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding 
New Hampshire’s restrictions on the use of prescrib-
er-identifiable data), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864 
(2009), including “the ability to target physicians 
prescribing large quantities of generic drugs, the 
ability to zero in on a physician’s customary prescrib-
ing choices, and the ability to punish physicians who 
fail to display allegiance to particular brand-name 
drugs.” Id. Section 17 directly addresses this issue. 
“Without question, the law restricts the flow of oth-
erwise private information about doctors’ prescribing 
habits and the care they provide to their patients. No 
party seriously disputes that.” IMS Health Inc. v. 
7 
Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183, *29 (2d Cir. 2010) (Living-
ston, J. dissenting) (App.1a-67a). 
 Physicians have a legitimate interest in main-
taining the confidentiality of information relating to 
their medical practice. At trial, Dr. Grande testified 
that “the privacy of patient welfare is likely to be 
compromised,” JA327, JA326-28. Dr. Kesselheim 
testified that removing data mining “will help pre-
vent inappropriate use or over prescription of drugs 
in patients” JA349-50. The Vermont Medical Associa-
tion resolved that “the doctor-patient relationship 
requires confidentiality and privacy to work effective-
ly,” JA376. See also Pet. Brief, at 7-10, 46-51. This is 
especially true “in an era of increasing and well-
founded concern about medical privacy,” Sorrell, 2010 
WL 4723183, at *25 (Livingston, J. dissenting). While 
Respondents found at least one physician who did not 
expect privacy, JA280, Section 17 permits that physi-
cian to opt into data mining. The law only applies to 
physicians who do have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
 Data mining also invades the privacy of Vermont 
patients, supra, pp. 5-6, Pet. Brief, at 7-8. Prescrip-
tion drug records are sensitive and consequential for 
individuals. Patients have an “interest in the nondis-
closure of private information and also their interest 
in making important decisions independently.” Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (privacy concerns about 
prescription drug records). In Whalen, the Court 
found “no support . . . for an assumption that the 
security provisions of the statute will be administered 
8 
improperly.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601. In the present 
case, the record is clear that Section 17 would extend 
privacy protections to prescriber-identifiable data, 
changing existing practices in the industry.  
 Respondents suggest that the prescription data in 
question goes through a process of de-identification, 
despite the presence of the longitudinal tracking 
number. JA158-60, 482-84. Such processes may once 
have been trustworthy, but advances in computer sci-
ence have compromised extant security techniques, 
“casting serious doubt on the power of anonymization” 
and lesser de-identification technologies. Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failures of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1701, 1716 (2010). These problems are especially 
acute in rural settings. In Vermont, “in small com-
munities identifying a drug prescription can equal 
the release of the individual’s diagnosis.” JA377. Data 
mining exposes a patient’s prescription history, and 
thus, their underlying medical conditions, to publica-
tion and exploitation, allowing companies to match 
prescriptions with specific patients. JA158-60, 482-84. 
This is a real concern, since 
insurance giants have ready access to appli-
cants’ prescription histories. These online re-
ports, available in seconds from a pair of 
little-known intermediary companies at a cost 
of only about $15 per search, typically include 
voluminous information going back five years 
on dosage, refills, and possible medical con-
ditions. The reports also provide a numerical 
9 
score predicting what a person may cost an 
insurer in the future. 
Chad Terhune, They Know What’s In Your Medicine 
Cabinet, Business Week, July 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/ 
b4094000643943.htm. Nor is this an isolated prob-
lem. “Two-thirds of all health insurers are using 
prescription data – not only to deny coverage to in-
dividuals and families but also to charge some cus-
tomers higher premiums or exclude certain medical 
conditions from policies . . . ”. Id. 
 Vermont also has a substantial interest in the 
medical privacy of communities. Even absent specific 
patient identification, the Respondents are able to 
know the diagnoses and treatment plans for each 
physician’s group of patients. PhRMA Cert. Brief, at 4 
(identifying physicians who treat a large number of 
diabetes patients); IMS Cert. Brief, at 3 (similar). A 
recent article by Sharona Hoffman illuminates some 
problems with pervasive use of health data in predic-
tive analytics. Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-
Health, 19 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 409 (2010). As 
Hoffman notes, electronic health records can be fed 
into “complex scoring algorithms” to “determine 
which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-
cost workers.” Id., at 422. It is not unrealistic for the 
state to be concerned that insurers, employers, and 
others will misuse the data to discriminate against 
certain towns or regions.  
 Respondents use prescriber-identifiable data 
without consent from either patient or physician, 
10 
essentially forcing the doctor and their patients to 
speak against their will. The First Amendment 
requires no such thing. “The right to speak and the 
right to refrain from speaking are complementary 
components of the broader concept of ‘individual 
freedom of mind.’ ” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 
714 (1977) (citation omitted) (affirming the right to 
refrain from speaking). Vermonters are exercising 
“the right to be let alone,” untroubled by data miners, 
echoing the sentiments of Justice Brandeis in his 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928) (“the right to be let alone” is “the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by 
civilized men”). 
 A majority of this Court recently renewed atten-
tion in “a constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.’ ” Nat’l Aeronautics 
and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 
(2011) (citations omitted). Medical records are a 
particularly apt subject for careful protection of 
privacy and confidentiality, which in this case pro-
vides an appropriate constitutional counterweight to 
First Amendment concerns. 
 
B. The Prescription Confidentiality Law 
Fits Within The Established Frame-
work Of State and Federal Privacy 
And Confidentiality Laws 
 In the larger context of privacy statutes regu-
lating access to information, the Vermont law is 
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unremarkable. “In the United States legal landscape, 
sensitive information is accorded special recognition 
through a series of key privacy statutes . . . ” Helen 
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash. 
L. Rev. 119, 129 (2004) (listing statutory and common 
law privacy protections). One example in the business 
context includes laws protecting trade secrets. Neal 
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: 
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 
123, 180-81 (2007) (“In many other contexts, such 
as trade secrets and business confidences, American 
law readily provides remedies against unwarranted 
breaches of trust.”). In general, the American legal 
system protects trade secrets from public disclosure 
or private commercial use by others, absent consent 
or independent creation, as long as the trade secret 
owner takes reasonable means to protect the secret. 
Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy 
Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 
Mich. St. L. Rev. 667, 698 (2006). 
 Respondents mischaracterize Section 17 as a ban 
on publication akin to “prohibit[ing] the Wall Street 
Journal from publishing stock prices.” IMS Cert. 
Brief at 13. Interesting, but not relevant in the least 
to this appeal. If a rival firm obtained data mining 
files from one of the Respondents without consent 
and published it in The Wall Street Journal or sold 
it for commercial purposes, they would hear a 
great deal about the reach and power of copyright 
and trade secrecy law, despite the First Amendment. 
 
  
12 
See e.g., Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food 
& Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(suing the FDA for posting trade secrets on its 
website); In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, 312 
F.Supp.2d 653, 664 (D.N.J., 2004) (“The presence of 
trade secrets or other confidential information weighs 
against public access and, accordingly, documents con-
taining such information may be protected from dis-
closure.”) (citations omitted). When weighed against 
trade secrets, the “First Amendment typically does 
not afford the press any greater right to information 
than the general public.” Id. at 664, n.6, citing Nixon 
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 
(1978). See also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Re-
straints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between 
Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from 
an Economic Perspective, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 5 (2001) (“[T]rade secrets, 
despite any expressive component, should be treated 
as property that falls outside the domain of the 
First Amendment. The very existence of a trade 
secret depends on maintaining its secrecy.”). The 
First Amendment is not a defense to data theft. 
 As a publisher, amicus THE NEW ENGLAND JOUR-
NAL OF MEDICINE owns trademarks and obtains 
copyrights to the articles they publish. If a rival firm 
steals entire articles, the JOURNAL will appropriately 
defend its intellectual property rights. The First 
Amendment does not block enforcement of the Copy-
right Act. “The press, like others interested in 
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publishing, may not publish copyrighted material 
without obeying the copyright laws.” Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991), citing Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 
(1977) (television station is not permitted to broad-
cast an entire performance without consent); see also 
Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial 
Speech Regulation, 58 S. Car. L. Rev. 737 (2007) 
(describing tensions between commercial speech and 
the Lanham Act). 
 The Respondents depend on these intellectual 
property and trade secrecy laws every day, and would 
not brook a First Amendment defense by an unau-
thorized user. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publi-
cation, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First 
Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1003, 
1006, 1035-46 (2000) (critical of First Amendment 
defenses against misappropriation of trade secrets). 
 Beyond the field of intellectual property, other 
laws restricting access to information do not derogate 
the First Amendment. “There are many federal 
provisions that forbid individuals from disclosing 
information they have lawfully obtained.” Boehner v. 
McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (listing 
many such examples, including grand jurors, court 
reporters, prosecutors, the Privacy Act, the Espionage 
Act, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, tax 
return information, state motor vehicle records, 
Social Security Administration records, and attorney-
client privileges).  
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 Even our video store rental records are protected 
from disclosure by federal law. Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. The law forbids 
the knowing disclosure of “personally identifiable 
information” concerning these rentals. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(1). If any person tried to sell or disclose this 
“personally identifiable information” without the 
consumer’s consent or a statutory exception, they 
would violate federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d). No 
doubt this information could be commercially or 
politically valuable. This Court needs no reminder of 
the political use of “personally identifiable” video 
rental information. But that does not trigger First 
Amendment protection for the person who obtained it 
improperly or another downstream user or publisher 
who was complicit. “A direct solicitation of unlawful 
activity may of course be proscribed, whether or not 
it is commercial in nature.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 579 (2001) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) citing Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
Even newspapers are subject to these rules: 
It is, therefore, beyond dispute that “[t]he 
publisher of a newspaper has no special im-
munity from the application of general laws. 
He has no special privilege to invade the 
rights and liberties of others.” Associated 
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S., at 132-133, 57 
S. Ct., at 655-656. Accordingly, enforcement 
of such general laws against the press is not 
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be 
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applied to enforcement against other persons 
or organizations. 
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. “The press may not with 
impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to 
gather news.” Id. at 669. 
 The larger framework of privacy statutes oper-
ates generally untroubled by First Amendment 
concerns. As Judge Easterbrook said in Travis v. 
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1998), “No one 
thinks that the Privacy Act violates the first amend-
ment. Well, maybe these plaintiffs do think this, but 
the position is untenable.” (emphasis in the original). 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia said: “Aguilar stands for the principle that 
those who accept positions of trust involving a duty 
not to disclose information they lawfully acquire 
while performing their responsibilities have no First 
Amendment right to disclose that information.” 
Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d at 579 (referring to 
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1995)). 
 Even in core First Amendment realms, privacy 
interests remain important. The Sixth Circuit held 
that a newspaper’s First Amendment rights must be 
balanced against the financial privacy interests of 
innocent third parties. In re Knoxville News-Sentinel 
Co., 723 F.2d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 1983). The language 
in that case is similar to Vermont’s declaration of a 
“reasonable expectation” of privacy, 2007 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves No. 80 (Act 80) § 1(29): 
These individuals possessed a justifiable 
expectation of privacy that their names and 
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financial records not be revealed to the pub-
lic. Their interests in privacy are sufficiently 
compelling to justify non-disclosure. United 
States v. Jenrette, supra, 653 F.2d at 620 (in-
terest in avoiding injury to innocent third 
parties properly weighed against broadcast-
ers’ right of access); Application of Am. 
Broadcasting Cos., 537 F.Supp. 1168, 1172-73 
(D.D.C.1982); Application of KSTP Televi-
sion, 504 F.Supp. 360, 363 (D. Minn. 1980). 
In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d at 477. 
One key error in the Court of Appeals below was the 
failure to appreciate this difference between un-
authorized access and subsequent publication. Pub-
lishers certainly have First Amendment rights, but 
not if the data was taken without consent, violating 
privacy, confidentiality, or intellectual property laws. 
Judge Livingston’s dissent noted that Vermont care-
fully chose to protect confidentiality at a point in the 
process well before publication. Sorrell, 2010 WL 
473183 at *17-18 (“because that first restriction 
prevents PI data from ever reaching the hands of 
plaintiff-appellants, the principal question to be 
resolved – and one the majority wholly overlooks – 
is whether the restrictions on pharmacies implicates 
the First Amendment interests of the data miners 
and pharmaceutical companies before the Court.”) 
(emphasis in original). As Judge Livingston further 
noted:  
Vermont’s law operates principally to pre-
vent them from obtaining otherwise private 
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PI data, and as such, does no more than re-
strict their unfettered access to information. 
This the First Amendment permits. See 
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 
14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (First Amendment 
“does not carry with it the unrestrained right 
to gather information”). 
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 2010 WL 473183 at *18 
(Livingston, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Vermont protects private health information from 
unjustified invasion with a number of current laws, 
including the Vermont Patient Privilege Statute, 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1612; the Vermont Patient 
Bill of Rights, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(7); and 
the Vermont Nursing Home Bill of Rights, Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 33, § 7301. These laws protect the privacy of 
Vermont patients, giving them the freedom to keep 
their medical records confidential if they so desire: 
The patient has the right to expect that all 
communications and records pertaining to 
his or her care shall be treated as confiden-
tial. Only medical personnel, or individuals 
under the supervision of medical personnel, 
directly treating the patient, or those per-
sons monitoring the quality of that treat-
ment, or researching the effectiveness of that 
treatment, shall have access to the patient’s 
medical records. Others may have access to 
those records only with the patient’s written 
authorization. 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(7) (the Vermont Bill of 
Rights for Hospital Patients). Nor is Vermont unique; 
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similar medical privacy statutes are in force across 
the country. Center on Medical Record Rights and 
Privacy, Health Policy Institute, Georgetown Uni-
versity (2011), available at http://hpi.georgetown.edu/ 
privacy/records.html (listing medical privacy laws in 
all 50 states plus the District of Columbia). Regu-
lating the practice of medicine has long been a tra-
ditional state function under the police power.  
 Respondents do not bring a preemption chal- 
lenge to the Prescription Confidentiality Law because 
Congress has clearly protected medical privacy laws 
like Section 17. The HIPAA statute explicitly saves 
more stringent state privacy laws from preemption:  
A regulation promulgated under paragraph 
(1) shall not supersede a contrary provision 
of State law, if the provision of State law im-
poses requirements, standards, or implemen-
tation specifications that are more stringent 
than the requirements, standards, or imple-
mentation specifications imposed under the 
regulation. 
HIPAA § 264(c)(2). Vermont’s more stringent privacy 
statutes are therefore expressly protected from 
preemption by federal law. 
 Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the federal 
government has identified no fewer than 18 sensitive 
data fields in medical records, and given these data 
fields special legal status as “protected health infor-
mation” or “PHI.” Id. Data fields such as the patient’s 
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name, social security number, address, and zip code 
(beyond the first three digits) are identified as PHI. 
Id. Improper disclosure of PHI violates federal law. 
Id. To our knowledge, no one has successfully brought 
a First Amendment challenge to GINA or the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, but if Respondents have the constitu-
tional right to commercialize prescriber-identifiable 
data without consent, it is hard to discern a meaning-
ful distinction that would prevent commercialization 
of the medical data protected by GINA and HIPAA as 
well. 
 The federal government takes these medical 
privacy rights seriously. Indeed, just this year the 
Office of Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services imposed two multi-
million dollar fines for violations of the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule. Mary Anne Pazanowski, HHS Breaks 
New Ground With $43 Million Penalty for HIPAA 
Privacy Rule Violation, 20 Health Law Reporter 277 
(BNA) (Feb. 24, 2011) (penalizing Cignet Health of 
Prince George’s County, Maryland, for “violating the 
rights of 41 patients”); Resolution Agreement, Febru-
ary 14, 2011, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/ 
privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/massgeneralra.pdf 
(settlement in which Massachusetts General Hospital 
agreed to pay a penalty of $1 million for accidentally 
leaving protected health information for 192 patients 
on a Boston subway train). Many other examples 
could be described. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, Ex-
Worker Indicted in Celebrity Patient Leaks Former 
Employee of UCLA Medical Center is Accused of 
Selling Data to the Media, L.A. Times, April 30, 2008; 
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Joyce E. Cutler, Kaiser Permanente Gets $187,000 
Fine For Second Patient Privacy Violation, 18 Health 
L. Rep. 974 (BNA) (July 2009). Pharmacies have also 
been sanctioned for privacy violations. CVS Privacy 
Practices Need Investigation Despite FTC Order, 
Pharmacist Group Says, 18 Health L. Rep. 397 (BNA) 
(March 2009) (noting the FTC Consent Order with 
CVS Caremark Corp., one of the country’s largest 
pharmacy chains). 
 Respondents’ arguments, if successful, will 
destroy both federal and state medical privacy and 
confidentiality laws, commercializing the most inti-
mate details of our medical histories, in a mistaken 
reliance upon the First Amendment.  
 
C. Consent For Limited Purposes Does 
Not Justify Commercial Data Mining 
 In a strange twist, Respondents argue that the 
Vermont law doesn’t do enough to protect privacy, as 
if they wished for a more comprehensive medical 
privacy law. IMS Cert. Brief at 2 (“Information relat-
ing to pharmaceutical prescriptions has long been 
widely distributed and used for numerous purpos-
es.”). Respondents mistakenly imply that medical 
privacy is somehow waived if the data is used for 
other limited purposes. PhMRA Cert. Brief at 9 
(“Section 17 expressly permits speech based on pre-
scriber history information for purposes of ‘pharmacy 
reimbursement; prescription drug formulary compli-
ance; patient care management; utilization review by 
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a health care professional, the patient’s health insur-
er, or the agent of either; or health care research’ ”). 
The Court of Appeals made similar observations. 
Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183 at *5 (“The statute ex-
pressly permits the sale, transfer, or use of PI data for 
multiple other purposes”). The Court of Appeals 
treated these limited exceptions as if all physician 
privacy rights had been extinguished. Sorrell, 2010 
WL 4723183 at *9 (“Physician privacy might be 
protected if the statute prohibited the collection and 
aggregation of PI data for any purpose, or if the use of 
such data were permitted in only rare and compelling 
circumstances.”) The Court of Appeals goes on to say 
“[t]he statute at issue here, however, does not forbid 
the collection of PI data in the first instance.” Id.  
 This is entirely mistaken, as “the record supports 
the conclusion that section 17 does not just reduce 
but dramatically reduces the spread of PI data.” 
Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183, at *29 (Livingston, J. 
dissenting). The plain text of the statute supports 
Judge Livingston. In the Prescription Confidentiality 
Law, Vermont articulated a “reasonable expectation” 
of privacy in prescriber-identifiable data: 
Health care professionals in Vermont who 
write prescriptions for their patients have a 
reasonable expectation that the information 
in that prescription, including their own 
identity and that of the patient, will not be 
used for purposes other than the filling and 
processing of the payment for that prescrip-
tion. Prescribers and patients do not consent 
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to the trade of that information to third par-
ties, and no such trade should take place 
without their consent. 
2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 1(29). Vermont 
was even more explicit in Section 1(31): “This act is 
necessary to protect prescriber privacy by limiting 
marketing to prescribers who choose to receive that 
type of information,” Act 80, § 1(31). For many years, 
the Vermont Bill of Rights for Hospital Patients has 
promised that “all communications and records per-
taining to his or her care shall be treated as confiden-
tial” except for permitted uses such as treatment and 
insurance. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(7).  
 If the constitutionality of Section 17 hinges on 
the alleged lack of clarity in Vermont’s statutes 
concerning privacy, then let this Court say so plainly. 
Vermont can then amend its laws to articulate addi-
tional statutory privacy rights and this litigation will 
commence again. But the Vermont Legislature has 
already spoken very clearly on this subject.  
 Of course, there are some important statutory 
exceptions to health privacy and confidentiality, 
primarily important government interests such as 
public safety and prevention of crime. Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 18, § 4631(e)(5)-(6). In addition, protections can be 
waived by written consent. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 
§ 1612(a). Common reasons for granting consent 
include medical treatment, insurance reimbursement, 
and research. Anyone receiving health care in the 
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U.S. in recent years will be familiar with these priva-
cy consent forms.  
 But these consent forms are limited to particular 
purposes and do not otherwise destroy the private 
and confidential nature of the information. Disclosure 
might be permitted to the insurance company to 
facilitate paying the bills, but the insurance company 
cannot then publish the information on the Internet. 
The waiver was for a limited purpose and the infor-
mation remains confidential. When someone tries to 
access PHI for another purpose, they suffer legal 
consequences, see supra pp. 19-20 (detailing HIPAA 
enforcement actions).  
 Pharmacies, health insurers and their interme-
diaries hold prescriber-identifiable medical records 
for limited purposes and subject to a duty to maintain 
confidentiality. These limited purposes include insur-
ance reimbursement, filling prescriptions, scientific 
research, and the other exceptions described in sub-
section (e) of the Prescription Confidentiality Law. Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(e). No one has given permis-
sion for this data to be used for any other purpose. If 
a pharmacy sells this private health information to 
the data mining Respondents, Vermont law has been 
broken under the first sentence of § 4631(d). At that 
point, drug companies have no right to purchase this 
private health information and then hide behind the 
First Amendment. Nor is state action evident here: 
under Vermont law, the decision whether to share 
this information with data mining companies rests in 
the hands of the physician, not the state.  
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 The Vermont law is an integral part of a much 
larger legal landscape supporting the privacy and 
confidentiality of medical records. The Vermont law 
operates under an express preemption waiver under 
HIPAA, which explicitly permits states to enact more 
stringent medical privacy laws. Vermont has done so, 
with no more derogation to the First Amendment 
than any other privacy, trade secrecy or intellectual 
property law. 
 
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT MISTAKENLY 
TREATED THE PRESCRIPTION CONFI-
DENTIALITY LAW AS AN UNLAWFUL 
RESTRICTION ON SPEECH 
A. Vermont Does Not Ban Drug Advertis-
ing 
 Respondents mischaracterize this case as com-
mercial speech, hoping for First Amendment protec-
tion for their activities. But Section 17 does not ban 
advertising, which distinguishes this case from much 
of this Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence. See 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 
(2002) (“We conclude, as did the courts below, that 
§ 127(a)’s provisions regarding advertisement and 
promotion amount to unconstitutional restrictions 
on commercial speech, and we therefore affirm.”); 
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562 (“the regulations pro- 
hibit advertising in a substantial portion of the 
major metropolitan areas of Massachusetts.”); 44 
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Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 
(1996) (“Our holding rests on the conclusion that such 
an advertising ban is an abridgment of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. . . .”); Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (“This case presents the 
question whether a regulation of the Public Service 
Commission of the State of New York violates the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments because it com-
pletely bans promotional advertising by an electrical 
utility.”); Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 752 (1976) (“It is 
clear, nonetheless, that all advertising of such prices, 
in the normal sense, is forbidden.”). For example, in 
Lorillard, Massachusetts directly regulated the 
placement of tobacco ads in stores. 533 U.S. at 562. 
Section 17, by analogy, merely delegates to the store-
owner the freedom to choose whether ads are appro-
priate. The heavy hand of the state is missing from 
Section 17.  
 Respondents also rely on Edenfield v. Fane, 507 
U.S. 761, 770 (1990), see PhRMA Cert. Brief at 16, 
IMS Cert. Brief at 15, 22, but none of these cases 
involves publication of improperly obtained private 
information. In Edenfield, the statute at issue prohib-
ited in-person solicitation by CPAs. If the Prescription 
Confidentiality Law prohibited in-person detailing by 
drug companies, then perhaps Edenfield would be 
directly relevant, but the Vermont statute does noth-
ing of the sort. The result in Edenfield would have 
been quite different if that law had merely prohibited 
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CPAs from using private, commercially valuable 
information taken without the consent of the client. 
For example, if a CPA tried to solicit new clients 
using the potential client’s stolen credit card infor-
mation, the First Amendment would stand aside 
when the state moved to stop this behavior.  
 The advertising ban cases should not be applied 
to overturn what is essentially a medical privacy law. 
Section 17 gives physicians the freedom to decide 
whether or not they will agree to share intimate 
details concerning their medical practices and pa-
tients with commercial data miners. That private 
decision is not a state-mandated ban on advertising.  
 
B. The Vermont Law – As Amended – Does 
Not Interfere With The “Marketplace 
of Ideas” 
 Section 17’s influence on the “marketplace of 
ideas” is not some heavy-handed pronouncement from 
the nanny state that regulates speech for drug detail-
ing. Section 17 fosters private ordering with precious 
little state action. Physicians decide on their own 
what medical privacy practices are best for their 
patients. Section 17 simply gives physicians the 
freedom to protect medical privacy and confidentiality 
as they see fit.  
 The only provision of Vermont law challenged 
today is Section 17. IMS Health Inc., 2010 WL 
4723183 at *1. The original version of Section 17 also 
included a quite different provision in former Section 
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4631(f) that directly regulated the content of speech 
by drug detailers when meeting with doctors and 
required detailers to provide state-approved evidence-
based information in those promotional meetings. 
Section 17. In 2008, the Vermont Legislature repealed 
this provision in its entirety. 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 
No. 89, § 3. The provision originally read:  
(f) When a pharmaceutical marketer en-
gages in any form of prescription drug mar-
keting directly to a physician or other person 
authorized to prescribe prescription drugs as 
provided for under this section, the marketer 
shall disclose to the prescriber evidence-
based information as provided for by rule de-
scribing the specific health benefits or risks 
of using other pharmaceutical drugs, includ-
ing drugs available over the counter; which 
patients would gain from the health benefits 
or be susceptible to the risks described; the 
range of prescription drug treatment options; 
and the cost of the treatment options. As 
necessary, the office of Vermont health ac-
cess, in consultation with the department of 
health, the area centers on health education, 
the office of professional regulation, and the 
office of the attorney general, shall develop 
rules for compliance with this subsection, in-
cluding the certification of materials which 
are evidence-based as defined in Section 
4621 of this title and which conditions have 
evidence-based treatment guidelines. The 
rules shall be consistent with the federal 
Food and Drug Administration’s regulations 
regarding false and misleading advertising. 
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To the extent practicable, the rules shall use 
the evidence-based standards developed by 
the blueprint for health. 
2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 17(f) repealed by 
2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 89, § 3. The Court of 
Appeals failed to fully consider the implications of 
this repeal. For example, much is made of Vermont’s 
proclaimed intervention into the “marketplace of 
ideas,” Act 80, § 1, and “ensuring prescribers receive 
unbiased information,” Section 17. IMS Health Inc., 
2010 WL 4723183 at *4-5 (“The findings expressly 
state the legislature’s intent to interfere with the 
marketplace of ideas to promote the interests of the 
state.”). The Court of Appeals went on at length: 
The legislature expressed its concern that 
the “marketplace for ideas on medicine safe-
ty and effectiveness is frequently one-sided,” 
leading doctors to prescribe “drugs based on 
incomplete and biased information.” Id. at 
§ 1(4). The legislature therefore found that 
“[p]ublic health is ill served by the massive 
imbalance in information presented to doc-
tors and other prescribers.” Id. at § 1(6). Sec-
tion 17 is the state’s attempt to correct what 
it sees as an unbalanced marketplace of ide-
as that undermines the state’s interests in 
promoting public health, protecting prescrib-
er privacy, and reducing health care costs. 
IMS Health Inc., 2010 WL 4723183 at *5. Reliance on 
these legislative findings in Act 80, §§ 1, 17 to support 
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a First Amendment challenge is misguided at best, as 
many of the findings relate to the now-repealed 
version of Section 4631(f). And yet, Respondents cite 
these irrelevant legislative findings incessantly, see 
IMS Cert. Brief at 1, passim; PhRMA Cert. Brief at 1, 
passim. The Respondents have made an interesting 
hypothetical argument that former Section 4631(f) 
might be unconstitutional, but that provision is not 
part of Vermont’s law. 
 In addition, some of the other legislative findings 
quoted by Respondents are not relevant for a differ-
ent reason. Many of the legislative findings relate to 
other provisions in Act 80 that Respondents have not 
challenged, and yet they mix-and-match in an at-
tempt to infer guilt by association. The unchallenged 
sections of Act 80 include many provisions that ad-
dress the allegedly biased nature of information in 
drug sales and represent Vermont’s attempt to inter-
vene in the market to reduce prescription drug prices. 
See, e.g., the Pharmacy Best Practices and Cost 
Control Program (establishing a program to “reduce 
the cost of providing prescription drugs,” including an 
“evidence-based preferred list of covered prescription 
drugs that identifies preferred choices within thera-
peutic classes for particular diseases and conditions, 
including generic alternatives and over-the-counter 
drugs.”); revisions to Vermont’s Pharmaceutical 
Marketing Disclosure Law; mandatory disclosure of 
the actual price of prescription drugs dispensed in 
Vermont; the creation of state pharmacy discount 
plans; regulation of pharmacy benefit managers; 
notice requirements for changes in preferred drug 
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lists; a state supported evidence-based education 
program; a generic drug voucher pilot project; ex-
panding the use of lower priced prescription drugs 
under the federal 340B program; an annual fee on 
drug companies, used to fund the evidence-based 
education programs described above; consumer 
protections against drug advertisements that do not 
comply with federal laws; and related insurance 
marketing reforms, Act 80, §§ 3-9, 11, 14-16, 20-22. 
 Respondents should stop quoting legislative 
findings in Act 80, § 1 that refer to unchallenged 
legislation unless it references the specific language 
in Section 17, as amended. Perhaps one day Respon-
dents can argue that these other provisions in Act 80 
are unconstitutional, but today is not that day. 
 
C. Medical Privacy Is A Substantial State 
Interest 
 With respect to privacy, the Court of Appeals 
improperly conflated the first and second prongs of 
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The first prong is 
satisfied because medical privacy is undeniably a 
substantial state interest. Supra §§ I.A. – B. In Trans 
Union, financial privacy was found to be a substantial 
state interest, Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Contra-
ry to the company’s assertions, we have no doubt that 
this interest – protecting the privacy of consumer 
credit information – is substantial.”). The state inter-
est in medical privacy is even more clear, given the 
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sustained interest in medical privacy at the state and 
federal levels, supra, §§ I.A. – B. 
 When Judge Koeltl dismissed the privacy argu-
ment as “speculative,” Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183 at 
*10, this is best understood as a claim that Vermont 
has not proved the third prong – in this case, whether 
Section 17 “directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted,” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
Hence, Judge Koeltl was actually operating under the 
second prong when he wrote, “Vermont has not shown 
any effect on the integrity of the prescribing process 
or the trust patients have in their doctors from the 
use of PI data in marketing.” Sorrell, 2010 WL 
4723183 at *10.  
 The First Circuit found the goal of cost contain-
ment to be sufficient, and did not fully take up the 
issue of privacy. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 84. In the Maine 
data mining case, the District Court held that “pa-
tient confidentiality is a substantial government 
interest,” IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F.Supp.2d 
153, 170 (D. Me. 2008), but the Attorney General of 
Maine did not extensively argue the Maine Legisla-
ture’s findings on prescriber privacy. Id. at 170-72. 
Similarly, in this case, the trial court below reached 
its decision on other grounds and did not fully consid-
er privacy. As the District Court below said:  
Because the Court accepts cost contain- 
ent and protecting public health as sub- 
tantial government interests, it need not 
consider the Attorney General’s assertion 
that protecting prescriber privacy is also a 
32 
substantial government interest. Cf. Ayotte, 
550 F.3d at 55 (restricting analysis to cost 
containment interest for “simplicity’s sake”); 
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461 (declining to 
consider an asserted interest because the 
regulatory scheme was sustainable based 
on another interest). 
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F.Supp.2d 434, 450 
(D. Vt. 2009) (App.68a-118a). If this Court finds 
Vermont’s privacy interests to be insufficiently articu-
lated during litigation, we urge this Court to remand 
this case back to the trial court to develop a full rec-
ord on the privacy interests advanced by Section 17. 
 
D. The Prescription Confidentiality Law 
“Directly Advances” Substantial State 
Interests  
 Vermont is entitled to protect privacy qua priva-
cy, not as a means to whatever social ends Judge 
Koeltl finds sufficiently meritorious. For example, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act easily survived a First 
Amendment challenge in 2001, even though it flatly 
prohibited the sharing of some types of data. Trans 
Union, 245 F.3d at 818 (“Trans Union’s First Amend-
ment challenge fares no better. Banning the sale of 
target marketing lists, the company says, amounts 
to a restriction on its speech subject to strict scruti-
ny. Again, Trans Union misunderstands our stan-
dard of review.”). The Trans Union court did not 
require that the Fair Credit Reporting Act directly 
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advance financial well-being, economic efficiency, or 
some other judicially-selected goal. Directly advanc-
ing financial privacy was enough.  
 It should be enough that the Prescription Confi-
dentiality Law was supported by an unanimous 
resolution from the Vermont Medical Society: “the use 
of physician prescription information by sales repre-
sentatives is an intrusion into the way physicians 
practice medicine.” JA376-78, at 378. This Resolution 
also stated: “the doctor-patient relationship requires 
confidentiality and privacy to work effectively.” 
JA376. Just as the state helped create this hazard by 
requiring the maintenance of prescriber records at 
Vermont pharmacies, Pet. Br. at 3-5, JA253, it is 
entitled to mitigate it by limiting the use of these 
records.  
 Vermont’s law vindicates other longstanding 
dimensions of health privacy. Rarely does a month go 
by without a revelation of a data breach, see supra pp. 
19-20. In a world where privacy is daily being eroded 
by technological advances, Vermont may deem it 
prudent to slow the dissemination of certain data in 
order to avoid similar breaches. Federal law has 
specifically permitted just such a move. HIPAA 
§ 264(c)(2). 
 Vermont’s concerns about data mining are well 
founded. The Respondents cannot plausibly deny that 
visits from sales representatives armed with pre-
scriber-identifiable data exert a powerful influence on 
physicians’ prescribing practices. Indeed, that is the 
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foundation of this multi-billion dollar business model. 
App.71a; JA169; A-168. Before the First Circuit, 
“[t]he plaintiffs did not deny that prescribing histo-
ries made detailing more efficacious.” Ayotte, 550 F.3d 
at 56. 
 
1. Data Mining Increases Costs 
 The medical literature confirms this pervasive 
influence. Many peer-reviewed studies have demon-
strated the substantial effect that detailing has on 
physician prescribing practices. An extensive record 
was developed at trial, JA145-46, 149, 156-58, 160-62, 
164-65, 325-28, 366, 376, 469, 473, 481-83, 488-90, 
494-95, 510, 525. In addition, the peer-reviewed 
literature is extensive, see, e.g., Ray Moynihan, et al., 
Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Disease Mongering, 324 BMJ 886 (2002); Katia 
Campo, et al., Physicians’ Decision Process for Drug 
Prescription and the Impact of Pharmaceutical Mar-
keting Mix Instruments, 22 Health Market. Quarterly 
73 (2005); Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, 
The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Re-
view, 5 Yale J. Health Policy, Law & Ethics 785 
(2005); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Phar-
maceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 
283 JAMA 373 (2000); Nicole Lurie, et al., Phar-
maceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Cen-
ters, 5 J. Gen. Internal Med. 240 (1990); Michael A. 
Steinman, et al., Characteristics and Impact of Drug 
Detailing for Gabapentin, 4 PLoS Med. 743 (2007); 
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Eric G. Campbell, et al., A National Survey of Physi-
cian-Industry Relationships, 356 New Eng. J. Med. 
1742 (2007). In short, detailing sells drugs. As the 
District Court noted:  
This is the strongest evidence of the im-
portant role of PI data in pharmaceutical de-
tailing. Put simply, if PI data did not help 
sell new drugs, pharmaceutical companies 
would not buy it. 
IMS Health Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d at 451. 
 
2. Data Mining Promotes Unsafe Drugs 
 Data mining also raises safety issues. Off-label 
promotion is a safety issue because the FDA has not 
approved the drug as safe and effective for the unap-
proved “off-label” use. Data mining is used extensive-
ly in off-label promotion, resulting in many lawsuits 
and enforcement actions against patent-based drug 
companies. Aaron S. Kesselheim & David Studdert, 
Whistleblower-Initiated Enforcement Actions Against 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse in the United States, 
1996 to 2005, 149 Annals Int. Med. 342 (2008); 
Michelle M. Mello, et al., Shifting Terrain in the 
Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 
360 New Eng. J. Med. 1557,1562-63, Table 2 (2009). 
Pfizer, a member company of Respondent PhRMA, 
recently agreed to plead guilty to off-label promotion 
of prescription drugs and pay a $2.3 billion fine. 
Jonathan D. Rockoff & Brent Kendall, Pfizer to Plead 
Guilty to Improper Marketing, Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 
2009. 
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 Prescriber-identifiable medical records were used 
to facilitate off-label promotion of gabapentin (Neu-
rontin). C. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman, 
The Neurontin Legacy – Marketing Through Misin-
formation, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 103 (2009). Signifi-
cant budgets were allocated for detailing and 
promotion to physicians who were high prescribers of 
gabapentin. Michael A. Steinman, et al., Narrative 
Review: The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of 
Internal Industry Documents, 145 Annals Int. Med. 
284, 287, Table 2 (2006). High prescribers are identi-
fied through data mining. Id., JA325, 481-82, 525. 
 Prescriber-identifiable medical records were used 
to facilitate off-label promotion of Xyrem, a drug 
approved for narcolepsy. The physician responsible 
for the off-label promotion was recruited by a detailer 
who “had noticed Gleason’s high prescription rate for 
Xyrem in 2003 and hired him to give speeches and 
visit other physicians to discuss off-label uses of the 
drug.” Mello, et al., Shifting Terrain, at 1561.  
 Prescriber-identifiable medical records were also 
used to promote rofecoxib (Vioxx). Data mining al-
lowed Merck to target specific physicians for detailing 
based on their prescription history. Litigation follow-
ing the withdrawal of rofecoxib has revealed the 
existence of elaborate sales training campaigns 
conducted by Merck (a member of the PhRMA Re-
spondent) to divert attention away from concerns 
about the cardiac risk posed by the drug during these 
detailer/physician meetings. See Aaron S. Kesselheim 
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& Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining 
Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308 (2007).  
 Three additional examples of data mining-related 
safety problems are nesiritide (Natrecor), Eric J. 
Topol, Nesiritide – Not Verified, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 
113 (2005), Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The Rise and 
Fall of Natrecor for Congestive Heart Failure: Impli-
cations for Drug Policy, 25 Health Affairs 1095 
(2006); ezetimibe (Zetia); and a combination of this 
drug with simvastatin (simvastatin/ezetimibe or 
Vytorin), Cynthia Jackevicius, et al., Use of Ezetimibe 
in the United States and Canada, 358 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1819 (2008).  
 
3. Section 17 Gives Vermont Physi-
cians The Freedom To Opt Out Of 
Data Mining 
 It should be noted that Vermont physicians 
cannot otherwise prevent the sale of their confiden-
tial information to data miners because they lack 
privity with the pharmacies and data intermediaries 
who sell the data. Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183 at *17 
(describing the creation of prescriber-identifiable data 
“without the knowledge or permission of the doctor, 
let alone the patient”) (Livingston, J., dissenting); 
IMS Health, 631 F.Supp.2d at 456-57 (describing 
the “three-step transaction” to create data mining); 
JA253-54; see also, Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, 
Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
Hastings L.J. 1227, 1260 (2003) (“Much of a person’s 
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sensitive information is not exclusively in the hands 
of that person – it is in the hands of various compa-
nies. Some are companies that a person does business 
with, such as financial institutions and utility com-
panies. But others are ones that gather data about 
people without their knowledge and consent.”).  
 The alternative process offered by the American 
Medical Association is unsatisfactory because only 5% 
of Vermont physicians are members of the AMA. 
JA402-03. Furthermore, the AMA process does not 
forbid data mining, only the use of the AMA Physi-
cian Masterfile, for which the AMA earns millions in 
royalty income from the data miners. The Prescrip-
tion Project, Prescription Data Mining, at 3 (Nov. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.prescriptionproject.org/ 
tools/initiatives_factsheets/files/0004.pdf (“The re-
sponse of the American Medical Association (AMA) to 
concerns about datamining has been weak. The AMA 
plays a key role in enabling the data-mining industry 
by selling its physician database to data-mining 
companies. . . . Sale of Masterfile data brought the 
AMA $44.5 million in 2005. Although the AMA initi-
ated an option in 2006 to allow physicians to “opt out” 
of this program, the process is cumbersome and few 
physicians are aware of the option. Moreover, even 
when a doctor “opts out,” the AMA continues to sell 
that doctor’s personally identifiable prescribing 
information. Pharmaceutical companies may still 
use the information to target their marketing efforts, 
as long as they pledge not to provide that individual 
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prescriber’s data directly to salespeople. Further-
more, the collection of prescribing data and identities 
through pharmacies is not affected by the AMA 
policies.”).  
 Respondents suggest that doctors could just 
forego detailing altogether, PhRMA Cert. Brief at 5, 
but in the view of many physicians that solution 
throws the baby out with the bathwater since a 
meeting with detailers can bring some benefits to the 
physician’s patients, including free samples for unin-
sured patients. JA411-12. “Many physicians thus 
tolerate detailing visits in order to reap the harvest of 
samples,” Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 46 (“The free samples, 
however, are highly prized.”) The most narrowly 
tailored and freedom-enhancing mechanism is to 
permit the physician to choose a middle course, 
detailing without data mining. 
 
E. Vermont Left This Complex Medical 
Decision In The Hands Of The Treat-
ing Physician 
 Amici have significant expertise in the evalua-
tion of peer-reviewed medical evidence. While the 
empirical evidence against data mining is signifi-
cant, Vermont did not choose to ban it outright or 
to directly regulate detailers’ speech. Instead, Ver-
mont promoted freedom by giving physicians the 
ability to evaluate the evidence themselves and then 
choose whether or not to participate in data mining. 
This promotes First Amendment values, favoring a 
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distributed model of scientific evaluation over a 
hierarchical decision-making structure.  
 Respondents attack Vermont’s legislative find-
ings as being insufficiently voluminous, Brief of 
Appellant PhRMA before the Second Circuit at 21-22, 
while simultaneously offering their experts to say 
that Vermont made a policy mistake. Respondents 
presented much of this evidence to the Legislature in 
hearings, and in many formal and informal meetings 
with their lobbyists. No complaint has been lodged 
concerning voting fraud or irregularity in legislative 
procedure. Indeed, Respondents concede that the Pre-
scription Confidentiality Law was legally approved by 
both the House and Senate in Vermont and signed by 
the Governor. Brief of Appellant PhRMA before the 
Second Circuit at 22. At the end of the process, the 
duly-elected representatives of Vermont disagreed 
with the Respondents and created the Prescription 
Confidentiality Law. Respondents ask this Court to 
ignore the democratic process in Vermont, and take 
Respondents’ side in many complex health policy 
issues such as the efficacy of various prescription drug 
cost saving measures, drug safety issues, and the wis-
dom of expanding privacy protections to prescriber-
identifiable medical records. The Vermont law wisely 
leaves these decisions in the hands of the doctor. 
 Furthermore, the cases cited in Respondents’ 
briefs generally relate to legislative determinations in 
an area where the government doesn’t have particu-
lar expertise, such as alcohol, tobacco and pharmacy 
advertising and solicitations by CPAs and in-home 
real estate agents. Here, Vermont does not just have 
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an opinion on data mining; they have years of direct 
experience, with billions of dollars in health care costs 
provided by and through the State. If Respondents 
have winning policy arguments, let them make those 
arguments to the people paying the bills and to the 
physicians seeing patients. Apparently, they lost 
those arguments, which sends them to this Court, 
looking for a third or fourth bite of the apple.  
 Finally, unlike some cases where a court is forced 
to evaluate scientific evidence, this Court is not 
required to do so today. Leave these complex matters 
of science and health policy in the hands of those best 
suited to make the decision – the prescribing physi-
cians who are able to discuss these issues with their 
patients. Let the individual physician decide whether 
data mining is detrimental or helpful. The First 
Amendment does not require unconsented disclosure 
of prescriber-identifiable medical records. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
decision and direct entry of judgment for the Peti-
tioner.  
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